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I. INTRODUCTION
Section 1905 of the proposed Federal Securities Code' sets forth
the applicability of the Code to transnational securities transac-
tions. The drafters could have stated in each provision of the Code
whether and to what extent it was to apply extraterritorially. In-
stead, they placed in one section a set of general principles that cuts
across all other sections of the Code and indicates which sections are
to have extraterritorial application. The result is a descriptive guide
that relies on a classification of transactions rather than a section-
by-section enumeration.
A single provision containing general principles that govern ex-
traterritorial application should meet at least three criteria. First,
* Adjunct Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center; member, New York and
District of Columbia Bars. B.A., University of Pennsylvania, 1964; L.L.B., Columbia Univer-
sity, 1967.
The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Ann E. Weigel in the preparation
of this Article.
1. ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 1905 (Proposed Official Draft, 1978) [hereinafter cited as 1978
Draft]. The complete text of § 1905 is set forth in the Appendix to this Article.
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it should be consistent with principles of international law govern-
ing the ability of a state to prescribe rules of law affecting conduct
over which another state might have an equal or stronger jurisdic-
tional claim. Second, it should be drafted with sufficient precision
to serve as a practical guide for lawyers and businessmen whose
activities will be governed by the Code. Third, it should properly
balance competing public policy interests of the United States.
The need to satisfy the first criterion is manifest: Congress
normally will not seek to intrude unduly into the affairs of other
nations.2 The drafters of section 1905 ensured that the Code would
meet this criterion by stating expressly in each paragraph delineat-
ing the Code's extraterritorial scope that it is not to extend beyond
"the limits of international law."
The second criterion-clear, unambiguous draftsmanship-
must be satisfied so that reasonable predictions can be made about
whether a proposed or continuing course of conduct will in the
future be deemed subject to one or more of the Code's provisions.
Such certainty is particularly important in the securities industry
for several reasons. First, many securities transactions are inher-
ently complex and require detailed advance planning. Second, be-
cause securities are intangible assets that are difficult to value, the
ordinary investor relies to a large extent on the advice of a securities
professional. This reliance is possible only if the investor has confid-
ence in the professional's integrity. If a securities firm is to maintain
its reputation for honesty and fair dealing, it cannot afford an alle-
gation of even an inadvertent violation of the securities laws. Third,
the potential financial liabilities in private damage actions based
upon securities law violations are so large that no financial institu-
tion, issuer, or other person involved in securities transactions can
afford unnecessary exposure to the risk of an adverse judgment.3
In general, section 1905 effects a vast improvement over exist-
ing law in terms of the certainty it affords, but, as will be demon-
strated below, the language of several of its provisions could be
clearer.' Maximum certainty could have been attained by delimit-
ing the Code's scope, either narrowly or broadly, with extreme preci-
sion. Instead, the approach taken in section 1905 is to sacrifice
2. See text accompanying note 111 infra. But if a statute does expressly extend extrater-
ritorially, the courts of the United States are bound only by the Constitution and not by
international law. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir.
1945).
3. See, e.g., Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1 (1977) (the Supreme Court reversed
a damage award of $36 million in favor of Chris-Craft on the ground that an unsuccessful
tender offeror does not have standing to sue under § 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act).
4. See text accompanying notes 62 & 76 infra.
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potential clarity for the assertion of as much extraterritorial juris-
diction as possible without transgressing the boundaries of interna-
tional law. The section is precise in some areas but ambiguous in
others; several provisions are quite broad in scope, although, as
noted above, all are circumscribed by the vague perimeter of inter-
national law. This approach leaves to the courts the task of deter-
mining what the ambiguous provisions were intended to mean and
when international law requires that the far-reaching provisions be
cut off.
The third criterion-correct balancing of public policy objec-
tives-must be satisfied so that the interests of the United States
in protecting investors within its territory5 and preventing the use
of its territory as a base from which to "export fraud"' are not
pursued singlemindedly to the detriment of its interest in maintain-
ing free and open access to investment capital in the world's devel-
oped capital markets.' The latter interest, recognized even by the
Securities and Exchange Commission (Commission or SEC),8 must
be supported if United States issuers are to have an opportunity to
attract foreign investment, which lowers their cost of capital,' and
if United States investors are to be able to diversify their holdings
and to hedge their risks by placing a portion of their funds in over-
seas investments. Other important interests that should be weighed
are the United States' relations with other nations and the ability
of its financial institutions to compete abroad effectively. Although
it is understandable that a securities code should emphasize protec-
tion of investors," the broader interests of the United States as an
international financial center must be borne in mind. As discussed
below, in several areas the Code seems to place excessive emphasis
on investor protection to the exclusion of other policy objectives."
It has been suggested that another criterion by which to judge
5. By contrast, a state does not have jurisdiction to prescribe rules of law governing
conduct affecting aliens outside its territory merely on the ground that the conduct affects
one of its nationals. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 30(2) (1965) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT].
6. See text accompanying note 81 infra.
7. U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, PUBLIC POLICY FOR AMERICAN CAPITAL MARKETS 18 (1974).
8. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 14128 § 11(A) (Nov. 2, 1977), reprinted in
[1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 81,361.
9. U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 7, at 18.
10. The preamble to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1976)
[hereinafter referred to as 1934 Act], sets forth the Act's purposes as follows: "To provide
for the regulation of securities exchanges and over-the-counter markets operating in interstate
and foreign commerce and through the mails, to prevent inequitable and unfair practices on
such exchanges and markets, and for other purposes."
11. See text accompanying notes 61-62 & 70-74 infra.
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section 1905 would be whether the Code follows faithfully the hold-
ings of decided cases in the area of extraterritorial application of the
securities laws.12 This is not a useful standard for several reasons.
First, the decided cases consist largely of efforts by the courts to
divine, in the absence of clear guidance from the language of the
securities lawsl3 or their legislative history, whether Congress con-
sidered the extraterritorial effect of these laws and what scope it
intended or would have intended them to have had it done so."
Accordingly, the cases are comprised chiefly of judicial attempts to
construe the provisions of existing statutes that the Code would
supersede. In drafting a new code, however, Congress should disre-
gard past judicial attempts at construction and decide ab initio the
proper scope of the Code's provisions on the basis of correct public
policy, subject to the limits of international law. Congress could
thereby provide clear guidance as to how it intends the Code to be
construed. Thus, existing precedents are useful only to the extent
that they discuss the limits international law places upon a state's
ability to apply its statutes extraterritorially.15
Second, in determining the extraterritorial scope of existing
securities laws, the courts in many cases have been faced with plain-
tiffs who have suffered substantial losses as a result of egregious
frauds.8 Consequently, the courts have strained their interpreta-
tions to reach a result that punishes malefactors and compensates
victims. Yet, they have been obliged to square their interpolations
of congressional intent with principles of international law. Rather
than producing a coherent statement of the extraterritorial applica-
tion of the securities laws, this process has yielded some confusing,
12. Karmel, The Extraterritorial Application of the Federal Securities Code, 7 CoNN.
L. REv. 669 (1975).
13. Section 30(b) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd(b) (1976), addresses the question
of extraterritorial application, but it has been criticized as being too ambiguous to serve as a
useful guide. See text accompanying notes 22-29 infra.
14. E.g., Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 985 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 1018 (1975).
15. As discussed in the text accompanying notes 34-49 infra, the courts have been
reluctant to assert jurisdiction to the limits allowable under international law. This reluc-
tance need not affect Congress, since international law does not impose any limit on the power
of Congress to enact laws. In Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, the court said:
[I]f Congress has expressly prescribed a rule with respect to conduct outside the United
States, even one going beyond the scope recognized by foreign relations law, a United
States court would be bound to follow the Congressional direction unless this would
violate the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.
468 F.2d 1326, 1334 (2d Cir. 1972).
16. See, e.g., ITT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1017 (2d Cir. 1975); Bersch v. Drexel
Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975).
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far-reaching, and often inconsistent principles." For the foregoing
reasons, substantial reliance on existing case law would appear mis-
placed. Unfortunately, the Reporter's Comments on section 1905's
predecessor, section 1604, suggest that in its preparation considera-
ble weight was given to the decided cases on extraterritoriality.,,
This Article will not analyze the existing cases, except to the
extent they offer instruction as to the effect of applicable interna-
tional law. Instead, it will examine the drafters' approach to extra-
territoriality and then judge whether section 1905 affords reasonable
predictability as to the Code's coverage of transactions with foreign
elements and whether it strikes an appropriate balance among the
competing goals of United States public policy respecting regulation
of transnational securities transactions.
II. THE CODE'S APPROACH TO EXTRATERRITORIALITY
A. General Structure
Section 1905 delineates the Code's extraterritorial scope and
thus gives the federal courts a basis for exercising subject matter
jurisdiction over transactions falling within its -intended coverage.
Three provisions of section 1905-paragraphs (a), (b), and
(c)-define this coverage. 9 Paragraph (a) states the circumstances
17. The following two statements from Bersch exemplify this point. First, the court
states "[w]hile merely preparatory activities in the United States are not enough to trigger
application of the securities laws for injury to foreigners located abroad, they are sufficient
when the injury is to Americans so resident." 519 F.2d at 992 (emphasis added). On the next
page, however, the court concludes that the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws
"[alpply to losses from sales of securities to Americans resident abroad if, but only if, acts
(or culpable failures to act) of material importance in the United States have significantly
contributed thereto . . . ." Id. at 993 (emphasis added). Assigning the emphasized terms
their customary meaning, it is difficult to understand how "merely preparatory" activities
can equal acts of "material importance."
18. See generally ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 1604, Reporter's Comments, at 165 (Tent. Draft
No. 3, 1974) [hereinafter cited as TD-3]. In addition, the Reporter made the following
observation with respect to § 1905:
This section codifies a good deal of the law on extraterritorial application of the SEC
legislation, which has produced a considerable number of precedents in recent years, and
sets the tone for further elucidation by rule. The approach is to make the substantive
coverage of the Code quite broad prima facie, though always "within the limits of
international law," and to rely on a revised and more specific rulemaking authority to
tailor that expression of power (in the international law sense) to the appropriate policy
considerations in the myriad contexts of the Code.
1978 Draft, supra note 1, Reporter's Introduction, at lxix.
19. Paragraph (d) codifies section 103(a) of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977,
Pub. L. No. 95-213, tit. I, 91 Stat. 1494 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1, 78dd-2, 78m(b),
78ff (Supp. 1977)). Paragraph (e) deals with personal jurisdiction. Paragraph (f) contains a
very technical provision concerning the nonapplicability of certain sections of the Code to
actions in foreign courts, and paragraph (g) is the cross-reference paragraph. None of these
paragraphs is discussed further herein.
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in which the Code is intended to apply. Paragraph (b) specifies
when the Code will not apply, but it does not "exempt" transac-
tions; instead, it "excludes" them. Those transactions set forth in
paragraph (b), therefore, are not carved out of paragraph (a); they
constitute distinct categories of conduct to which the Code is ex-
pressly inapplicable. This is more than a semantic point-it means
that the rule of construction providing that exemptions, particularly
exemptions from remedial statutes, are to be narrowly construed
does not apply to section 1905(b).2 0
Paragraph (c) empowers the Commission, by rule, to contract
the coverage of paragraph (a), expand the coverage of paragraph
(b), or determine whether the Code shall apply in any set of circum-
stances not covered by either (a) or (b). Paragraph (c) also directs
the SEC to draft exemptive rules delineating the extent to which the
registration provisions of the Code2' will apply to nonresident is-
suers.
B. Section 30(b) of the Securities Exchange Act
One of the few provisions of the existing securities laws ex-
pressly recognizing that the securities business exists outside as well
as within the United States is section 30(b) of the Securities Ex-
change Act (the Act).22 This section provides that:
The provisions of [the Act] or of any rule or regulation thereunder shall not
apply to any person insofar as he transacts a business in securities without the
jurisdiction of the United States, unless he transacts such business in contrav-
ention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as
necessary or appropriate to prevent the evasion of [the Act].
This language has been construed as an attempt to relieve foreign
persons in the securities business from reporting and registration
under the Act."
The Commission has never adopted rules under section 30(b).
According to Philip A. Loomis, Jr., the longest sitting of the SEC
Commissioners and a longtime staff member as well, the principal
reason is that the courts have construed the exemption narrowly,
making such rules unnecessary. 24 An additional reason is that any
rules under section 30(b) might involve the SEC in seeking to regu-
20. Woods v. Oak Park Chateau Corp., 179 F.2d 611 (7th Cir. 1950).
21. 1978 Draft, supra note 1, § 402.
22. 1934 Act § 30(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78dd(b) (1976).
23. Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 207 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied sub nom.,
Manley v. Schoenbaum, 395 U.S. 906 (1969).
24. Loomis & Grant, Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Securities Laws, 1 J. ComP.
CoRp. LAw & SEC. REG. 3, 16 (1978).
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late foreign broker-dealers abroad or, by implication, might broaden
the exemption.15
Although this provision has been at the heart of a number of
cases concerned with the extraterritorial application of the securi-
ties laws, its terms have raised questions as to its meaning." One
dispute over its interpretation is whether the words, "the jurisdic-
tion of the United States," refer to territorial or judicial jurisdic-
tion.Y Another is whether an isolated sale of securities constitutes
"[transaction of] a business in securities."" Because of problems
of this nature, the Code's drafters have abandoned the language of
section 30(b).29
C. Sources of Section 1905
The drafters of the Code were well aware of the relevant rules
of international law. 0 The principles of international law applicable
to questions of transnational jurisdiction are articulated in sections
17 and 18 of the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the United
States" (Restatement) and are reflected in clauses (A) and (D) of
section (a)(1) of the Code. Section 17, which is said to embody the
"subjective" principle of transnational jurisdiction, provides that:
A state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law
(a) attaching legal consequences to conduct that occurs within its terri-
tory, whether or not such consequences are determined by the effects of
the conduct outside the territory, and
(b) relating to a thing located, or a status or other interest localized,
in its territory. 2
Under this provision, a state's jurisdiction over conduct within its
territory exists without regard to the locus of the conduct's effects
or the nationality of the actor or the victim.
Section 18 of the Restatement embodies the "objective" princi-
ple. Pursuant to this principle:
25. Id.
26. See, e.g., SEC v. United Financial Group, Inc., 474 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1973); Roth
v. Fund of Funds, Ltd., 405 F.2d 421 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 975 (1969); Schoen-
baum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 207 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied sub nom., Manley v.
Schoenbaum, 395 U.S. 906 (1969).
27. 474 F.2d at 357-58.
28. 405 F.2d at 207.
29. TD-3, supra note 18, § 1604, Reporter's Comments, at 161.
30. Id. at 161-62.
31. RESTATEMENT, supra note 5, §§ 17-18.
32. Although there is no "or" between clauses (a) and (b), the illustrations offered in
the Restatement treat them as if written disjunctively. Judge Friendly observed this inconsis-
tency in Leasco. 468 F.2d at 1334.
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A state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law attaching legal consequences
to conduct that occurs outside its territory and causes an effect within its
territory, if either
(a) the conduct and its effect are generally recognized as constituent
elements of a crime or tort under the laws of states that have reasonably
developed legal systems, or
(b) . . . (ii) the effect within the territory is substantial; (iii) it occurs
as a direct and foreseeable result of the conduct outside the territory; and
(iv) the rule is not inconsistent with the principles of justice generally
recognized by states that have reasonably developed legal systems."
This principle permits jurisdiction to attach where the effects of
conduct are felt, irrespective of the locus of the conduct.
Notwithstanding the subjective principle of section 17, in secur-
ities law cases the courts have expressed unwillingness to extend
conduct-based jurisdiction to the limits permitted by international
law.34 This reluctance has persisted, even in the face of SEC argu-
ments that the slightest use of the jurisdictional means35 in connec-
tion with actionable conduct provides a sufficient basis for subject
matter jurisdiction, regardless whether the principal elements of the
transaction occurred abroad." The courts' reluctance to extend ju-
risdiction to the limits of international law has been based upon the
absence of clear extraterritorial intent in the statutes under which
virtually all the cases have been brought37 and the rule of construc-
tion holding that statutes are presumed not to apply extraterrito-
rially unless a contrary intention is expressed." Thus, the courts
have examined a number of factors in deciding whether jurisdiction
was intended to be asserted, including the nature of the acts in
question, the extent to which they occurred in the United States,
the residence and nationality of the victims, and whether the plain-
tiff was the SEC or a private party.39
33. RESTATEMENT, supra note 5, § 18.
34. Id.; see Travis v. Anthes Imperial, Ltd., 473 F.2d 515 (8th Cir. 1973). See also
Loomis & Grant, supra note 24, at 8.
35. See, e.g., 1934 Act § 10, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1976) (prohibiting "any person, directly
or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the
mails, or of any facility of a national securities exchange" to employ a manipulative or
deceptive device in connection with a purchase or sale of securities).
36. See SEC v. United Financial Group, Inc., 474 F.2d 354, 357 (9th Cir. 1973); Brief
for SEC as Amicus Curiae at 13, Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1968).
37. The Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a (1976) [hereinafter referred to as 1933
Act], is silent as to its extraterritorial effect. With regard to the limited extraterritorial
language of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, see note 13 supra.
38. Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949); Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S.
421, 437 (1932).
39. ITT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975); Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc.,
519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975).
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Section 18 of the Restatement focuses exclusively on the locus
of the effects of the conduct and ignores the situs of the conduct
itself. The case that carried this principle to its furthest extreme was
Schoenbaum v. First brook, 0 in which the Second Circuit found that
Congress intended the antifraud provisions of the securities laws to
be given extraterritorial effect:
to protect domestic investors who have purchased foreign securities on Ameri-
can exchanges and to protect the domestic securities market from the effects
of improper foreign transactions in American securities. In our view, neither
the usual presumption against extraterritorial application of legislation nor the
specific language of Section 30(b) show Congressional intent to preclude appli-
cation of the Exchange Act to transactions regarding stocks traded in the
United States which are effected outside the United States, when extraterrito-
rial application of the Act is necessary to protect American investors."
The court did find, however, that some conduct associated with the
transaction in question occurred in New York.4 2 Thus, the decision
in the case can be interpreted as resting on conduct as well as
effects. Moreover, in Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp. v.
Maxwell,3 in which conduct within the United States had fraudu-
lently induced an American corporation to purchase foreign securi-
ties abroad, the court questioned whether, if the alleged misconduct
had occurred solely in England, the adverse impact upon the plain-
tiff and its American shareholders would support jurisdiction."
Judge Friendly, writing for the Second Circuit, took the position
that "[w]hen no fraud has been practiced in this country and the
purchase or sale has not been made here, we would be hard pressed
to find justification for going beyond Schoenbaum."" While
Schoenbaum has been said to support jurisdiction based on effects
alone," at least one commentator has taken the view that all the
cases have involved conduct as well as effects." Moreover, from a
practical viewpoint, when conduct occurs in one state and produces
an effect in another, the principles set forth in sections 17 and 18
may afford both states jurisdiction to prescribe rules of law attach-
ing consequences to the conduct;" this overlapping jurisdiction can
40. 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied sub nom., Manley v. Schoenbaum, 395 U.S.
906 (1969).
41. Id. at 206.
42. Id. at 210.
43. 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972).
44. Id. at 1334.
45. Id.
46. See Loomis & Grant, supra note 24, at 11.
47. Karmel, supra note 12, at 678.
48. RESTATEMENT, supra note 5, § 17(a), Comment b, § 18, Comment d.
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produce a conflict of laws.49
The foregoing discussion illustrates several reasons why exist-
ing case law, another important source of the Code's extraterritorial
provision, is not an important criterion by which to judge section
1905. There are numerous decided cases on the extraterritorial ap-
plication of the securities laws,"o and the SEC has played a role in
shaping the outcome of many of them, either as a party or through
an amicus brief.' It is not essential for present purposes, however,
to analyze the faithfulness with which section 1905 traces the con-
tours of these cases. Although the Code was intended to codify exist-
ing law, the Reporter has made it abundantly clear that the drafters
did not feel bound by existing law if reform seemed desirable and
practicable,52 and the Code is filled with examples of such depar-
tures.53 In addition, since many of the cases have involved rather
serious allegations of fraud, often of dramatic proportions," most of
them are ill-suited to the broader task of determining whether spe-
cific regulatory provisions of the Code should apply to essentially
nonfraudulent transnational securities transactions. Finally, as
noted above, the courts in previous cases have analyzed the facts
before them chiefly to discern not whether international law would
support the exercise of subject matter jurisdiction but whether Con-
gress intended such an application of the Act-a question of consid-
erable irrelevance in preparing a statute that will speak directly to
that issue.
An additional source of the Code's provisions apparently is SEC
administrative practice. 5 Apart from its enforcement efforts, the
Commission's policy concerning extraterritoriality has been reason-
ably well articulated. For example, an entire body of "lore" govern-
ing offshore offerings by United States issuers has been developed
by means of releases and no-action letters issued by the SEC staff
49. Id. § § 37-40 (discussion of the resolution of the resulting conflicts). For a discussion
of potential conflicts, see text accompanying notes 70-75 infra.
50. A number of articles have analyzed these cases. See, e.g., Karmel, supra note 12;
Loomis & Grant, supra note 24; Sandberg,The Extraterritorial Reach of American Economic
Regulation: The Case of Securities Law, 17 HARV. INT'L L.J. 315 (1976).
51. See, e.g., Brief for SEC as Amicus Curiae, Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200
(2d Cir. 1968).
52. See, e.g., 1978 Draft, supra note 1, Reporter's Introduction, at xv.
53. See, e.g., Bialkin, The Issuer Registration and Distribution Provisions of the Pro-
posed Federal Securities Code, 30 VAND. L. REV. 327 (1977).
54. See, e.g., ITT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975); Bersch v. Drexel
Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975).
55. TD-3, supra note 18, § 1604, Reporter's Note (9).
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in response to specific factual situations." The drafters of the Code
apparently have not ignored this material.5 7
III. ANALYSIS OF SECTION 1905
A. Section 1905(a) (1)
Section 1905(a)(1) provides that "[w]ithin the limits of inter-
national law, this Code . . . applies with respect to" the types of
conduct that are specified in clauses (A) through (D).51 Each of
these clauses will be examined in turn.
Clause (A) is keyed to the same four basic types of conduct with
which the antifraud provisions of Code section 1602(a) are con-
cerned: (1) purchases and sales, offers to buy or sell, and induce-
ments not to buy or sell; (2) proxy solicitations; (3) tender offers and
related recommendations; and (4) investment advisory activity (but
in each instance only when such conduct occurs within the United
States, even though it may have been initiated abroad). Clause (A)
means that whatever consequences the Code may prescribe for con-
duct that occurs wholly within the United States likewise will at-
tach to such conduct when initiated outside the United States, ir-
respective of whether the conduct has any significant effect in the
United States or elsewhere. Clause (A) thus expresses the subjective
territoriality principle embodied in section 17 of the Restatement.
Under clause (A), if a Belgian company were to offer securities in
the United States, or if a German company were to invite tenders
by United States residents of securities of a Dutch issuer, or even if
a Swiss investment adviser were to recommend to a United States
resident a French security traded only abroad, the Code would
apply.
One issue raised by clause (A) is the type of contact necessary
for a transaction to occur "within the United States." Suppose a
German corporation were to sell its securities in London to the
United Kingdom subsidiary of a United States-registered broker-
dealer acting for the account of a customer-a United Kingdom
subject normally resident in London but who confirmed the transac-
tion by telephone from Florida. It is not clear whether under clause
(A) the telephone call would constitute conduct "within the United
States;" 9 however, the Reporter's Notes to Tentative Draft No. 3
56. See, e.g., SEC Securities Act Release No. 4708 (July 9, 1964), reprinted in 1 FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) § 1361.
57. See, e.g., 1978 Draft, supra note 1, § 1905(b)(2)-(3).
58. For the text of § 1905(a)(1), see Appendix.
59. Section 1905(b)(2) provides that such a transaction would not in itself require the
United Kingdom subsidiary to register as a broker under § 702 of the 1978 Draft of the Code.
19791 505
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
suggest it would."0
Regardless of what the phrase "within the United States"
means, if clause (A) is read literally, even a single, isolated act
within the territory of the United States would trigger the applica-
bility of the Code. For example, if two Japanese businessmen meet
in New York, agree upon a sale of Sony common stock to be deliv-
ered in Japan, and fly back to Tokyo on the next plane, under the
terms of clause (A) the Code would apply to that sale. At least one
court, however, has questioned whether such an exercise of subject
matter jurisdiction is permissible under international law when no
effect of the conduct is felt in the United States."'
To permit the assertion of jurisdiction on the basis of such de
minimus contacts with the United States could produce undesirable
consequences. For example, if international businessmen know that
any discussion in the United States of a proposed sale or purchase
of securities, even when no American is involved as a principal, may
subject that transaction to the full range of United States securities
regulation, they may shun this Nation as a place to negotiate, plan,
or arrange business transactions. The ultimate result might be to
diminish the role of the United States as a world financial center
and to reduce the worldwide demand for its banking, insurance,
legal, accounting, and other ancillary services. The Code's drafters
may be aware of this problem and perhaps are relying on the SEC
to promulgate rules narrowing the scope of clause (A) pursuant to
section 1905(c)(1)(A) to prevent such a result.6 2 An alternative ap-
proach would be to require here, as in clause (D), that the act's
constituent elements occur at least to a substantial extent in the
United States, so that truly minimal contacts would not trigger
subject matter jurisdiction.
Apart from the issue of correct policy suggested by clause (A)'s
apparent de minimus contacts standard, the clause also raises an
interpretive problem in cases in which a single, covered act within
the territory is part of a large, essentially foreign, transaction. It is
60. TD-3, supra note 18, § 1604, Comment 3(b). The comment, which refers specifically
to clause (A)'s predecessor, states that "[p]resumably everybody would agree that the mak-
ing of an offer from another country into the United States by mail or telephone is subject to
Sec. Act H§ 5 and 17(a) even though neither the seller nor an agent of the seller sets foot in
the United States." Apparently, the Reporter believes clause (A) is analogous and that use
of the mails or the telephone would trigger its applicability. Perhaps a court faced with clause
(A) would disagree, however, and construe the phrase "within the United States" as a terri-
torial concept, as the defendants argued § 30(b)'s language, "the jurisdiction of the United
States," was a territorial reference in SEC v. United Financial Group, Inc., 474 F.2d 354 (9th
Cir. 1973). The Reporter's notes, however, are to be part of the Code's legislative history.
61. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972).
62. See note 18 supra.
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unclear, for instance, whether, if the sale of Sony stock in the pre-
vious example were part of a public stock offering in Japan by a
Japanese seller, the Code would apply to the entire transaction. To
hold that it would is to arrive at an unsupportable result in terms
of both law and policy, since the sales effected in Japan would
constitute neither conduct nor effect in the United States. Undoubt-
edly, the correct interpretation is that the Code would not apply to
such sales, and that only the sale within the United States is cov-
ered; however, this point should be clarified.
Clause (B) provides that the Code is applicable to "a nonresi-
dent of the United States that has a status described in section
1902(b), to the extent that the Code attaches consequences to such
a status." Section 1902(b) covers issuers registered under the Code
and other registered persons (including brokers, dealers, and invest-
ment advisers), insiders with respect to a registrant, persons who
make tender offers, United States banks, and certain other types of
persons." As an illustration, a Dutch broker who registers as such
under the Code thereby would become subject to all provisions of
the Code governing registered brokers, at least in so far as his resi-
dent United States customers are concerned. Clause (B) does not
specify the extent to which those provisions apply to his dealings
with his Dutch customers, although it is possible to read section
1902(b), which applies "without regard to use of the mails or Federal
commerce," as making those provisions applicable. As discussed
below," however, section 1905(b)(2) would seem to exclude him
from the registration requirements of the Code to the extent that he
does business with customers outside the United States and, in all
likelihood, from its provisions governing registered brokers as well.
Clause (B), then, is aimed chiefly at those nonresidents whose
activities in the United States are deemed sufficient to require that
they register or otherwise submit themselves to the jurisdiction of
the United States for purposes of its securities laws. It is difficult
to fault the proposition that registered nonresidents should receive
63. Section 1902(b) provides as follows:
Status of actor or issuer. This Code applies without regard to use of the mails or
Federal commerce in connection with a particular act or omission if the actor, the person
required to act, or the issuer of a security involved in the act or omission is (1) a
registrant, (2) any other person registered under this Code, (3) a person within section
605 or 606 so far as those sections are concerned, (4) a participant in a registered clearing
agency, (5) a bank, (6) a mutual service company, or (7) an associate, or person acting
on behalf, of any such person.
1978 Draft, supra note 1, at 707.
64. The exclusion of foreign residents from the broker-dealer registration requirements
of the Code is treated below in the discussion of § 1905(b)(2) and (3) in the text accompanying
notes 83-122 infra.
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the same treatment as registered residents, provided they have not
unfairly been obliged to register in the first instance."
Clause (C) merits little discussion. It is a criminal provision
bringing within the Code's scope any "attempt, solicitation, or con-
spiracy outside the United States [to violate the] Code within the
United States." Certainly a state is justified in seeking to use its
police power to deter criminal activities directed within its borders
from abroad."
Perhaps the most troublesome provision in this portion of the
Code is clause (D). This clause brings within the Code's coverage
any other prohibited, required, or actionable conduct (i) whose constituent
elements occur to a substantial (but not necessarily predominant) extent
within the United States or (ii) some or all of whose constituent elements occur
outside the United States but cause a substantial effect within it (of a type
that this Code is designed to prevent) as a direct and reasonably foreseeable
result of the conduct.
By its express terms, clause (D) is a residual clause for all types
of regulated conduct not covered elsewhere in section 1905(a). It
reaches any other conduct that is "prohibited, required, or actiona-
ble." If it is read broadly, however, as the Reporter's Notes suggest
it should be," clause (D) ignores the more carefully drawn provi-
sions of the preceding three clauses of section 1905(a)(1). Instead,
it purports to reach any type of regulated conduct those clauses
might fail to include, provided only that its lower threshold of con-
tacts with the United States is satisfied. Because of the sweeping
implications of this clause, the latter point merits further analysis.
In so far as the type of conduct covered by clause (D) is con-
cerned, the phrase in clause (D), "any other prohibited, required,
or actionable conduct," must refer to all conduct that is not covered
by clauses (A) through (C) of section 1905(a)(1) (for example, con-
duct not covered because the act specifically described in clause (A)
does not occur within the United States, as clause (A) would re-
quire), and not just conduct that is not specifically described in
65. See text accompanying note 83 infra.
66. See, e.g., Criminal Code Reform Act of 1977, S. 1437, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., § 1126
(1977); H.R. 6869, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., § 1126 (1977).
67. Note (2) following § 1905(c) reads as follows:
§ 1905(a)(1)(D): A new comment to Clause (D) will state that the "constituent
elements" phrase is not limited to acts essential to the establishment of the "prohibited,
required, or actionable conduct." Thus, Clause (i) is broad enough, in the context of Ithe
antifraud provision of the Code relating to purchases and sales], to cover (within the
limitations of that clause) a sale consummated in England pursuant to negotiations in
both England and the United States even though the only misrepresentations occurred
in the negotiations abroad.
1978 Draft, supra note 1.
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clauses (A) through (C) of section 1905 (that is, conduct other than
sales, purchases, proxy solicitations, and the like). Reporter's Note
(2) seems to confirm this interpretation, since it contemplates that
clause (D) would apply to a sale, notwithstanding that sales are
expressly covered by clause (A).
Turning to the locus of the conduct, subclause (i) of clause (D)
refers to conduct whose constituent elements occur to a substantial
extent within the United States. By implication, then, under clause
(D) the regulated act itself-a sale, for example-may occur abroad.
Under clause (A), however, the regulated act apparently must occur
within the United States for subject matter jurisdiction to exist.
Since types of conduct specified in clause (A) are among those most
closely regulated by the Code," it is curious that the Code sets a less
stringent standard of contact with the United States for the more
generalized conduct that is the subject of clause (D). One might
have expected the latter, more broadly based, provision to employ
a stricter test as to the proportion of the regulated act that must
occur within the United States.
Assuming the foregoing interpretation of clause (D) is correct,
the courts will have to decide what comprises the constituent ele-
ments of a particular regulated act." Thus, clause (D) does little to
advance the goal of greater predictability of the Code's extraterrito-
rial impact. Moreover, in cutting so wide a swath, clause (D) raises
serious questions of policy, similar to but even more grave than
those noted in the discussion of clause (A) above.'"
Subclause (ii) of clause (D) presents further problems. That
subclause resembles closely the jurisdictional standard of section 18
of the Restatement with respect to the domestic effects of conduct
abroad; however, it omits the third condition of section 18: that the
regulation or proscription not be inconsistent with generally recog-
nized principles of justice in states that have reasonably developed
legal systems. Of course, this condition is implicit, since section
1905(a)(1) is, as noted above, by its terms circumscribed by the
limits of international law. Nonetheless, since the other elements of
section 18-that the effects of the conduct be substantial, direct,
and foreseeable-are specifically mentioned, the exclusion of this
condition is curious.
68. See id. § 1602(a).
69. The Reporter's Note quoted in note 67 supra indicates that the term "constituent
elements" is intended to have quite a broad scope. It is unclear, however, whether acts that
are, in the words of Judge Friendly in Bersch, "merely preparatory" would rise to the level
of constituent elements. See note 17 supra.
70. See text accompanying notes 58-62 supra.
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This observation also suggests a more fundamental problem
concerning the breadth of subclause (ii). Whether or not the prohi-
bition of fraud is consistent with principles of justice generally rec-
ognized by states with developed legal systems, the concept of
fraud, as applied in the context of securities transactions in the
United States, probably extends further than it does in most other
jurisdictions. The principal element of fraudulent conduct, as it has
come to be understood in this context, is the failure by either party
to the transaction to make full disclosure of all material facts.',
Numerous countries with developed legal systems have con-
sciously rejected full disclosure as an element of their regulation of
corporate and financial activity. 72 For example, French regulators
have played down implementation of an elaborate system of corpo-
rate disclosure in an attempt to encourage issuers to enter the devel-
oping French capital market." A Swiss author has suggested that
Europeans have not accepted full disclosure as a substantial aid to
making investment decisions." Even less in the way of disclosure is
required in developing nations such as Brazil, Pakistan, Korea, and
the Philippines, which, though they may not be full-scale industrial
powers, certainly have reasonably developed legal systems.
In light of this discrepancy in philosophy, an attempt under
clause (D) to apply the Code's antifraud provisions to a transaction
occurring in a nation that has rejected the concept of full disclosure
could be found by a court to go beyond the limits of international
law: such an application of the Code would violate the third condi-
tion of Restatement section 18, notwithstanding substantial, direct,
and foreseeable effects within the United States. Admittedly, the
test under section 18 is whether the rule of law is inconsistent with
generally recognized principles of justice, not those of a particular
state. But even if a court were unable to assess what such generally
recognized principles would provide, and if it were to face a conflict
as a result of a contrary policy in the state with conduct-based
jurisdiction, then the predominant interest of that state might well
71. Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 473-74, 477 (1977).
72. Widmer, The U.S. Securities Laws-Banking Law of the World? (A Reply to
Messrs. Loomis and Grant), 1 J. COMP. CORP. L. & SEC. REG. 39 (1978).
73. See Sandberg, supra note 50, at 327-28.
74. According to Peter Widmer, a member of the Zurich Bar:
To Euiropeans, the basic burden of judging an investment is on the investor; Europe-
ans do not believe that full disclosure greatly helps him in making his decision. They
rather place emphasis on the functioning of competition in the capital markets, on
professional control by banks and investment advisers and, finally, on the general crimi-
nal provisions of the European criminal codes prohibiting fraud in the form of "obtaining
monies through willfully false pretenses" with the intent to damage the investor.
Widmer, supra note 72, at 39-40.
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prevail, without regard to generally recognized principles.75 Further,
apart from whether clause (D) would raise problems under interna-
tional law, assertion of jurisdiction over foreign entities carries ob-
vious potential for disrupting our relations with the nations in which
the entity is domiciled.78 The above catalogue of interpretive, legal,
and policy issues that might flow from adoption of clause (D) sug-
gests that this provision may be inconsistent with the statement of
objectives laid down for section 1905 in the Introduction to this
Article. Serious consideration should be given to its deletion.
B. Sections 1905(a) (2) and 1905(b)(1)
Sections 1905(a)(2) and 1905(b)(1) treat the four basic acts
specified in clause (A) from the opposite perspective-when the act
is initiated within the United States but occurs abroad.77 Reading
these two provisions together produces the following result: when
the conduct is thus "exported," the four basic acts are not covered
by the Code, except that the antifraud provisions of part XVI are
applicable. As an illustration, a distribution of securities of a United
States issuer effected abroad would remain free from the Code's
distribution rules but would be subject to the antifraud rules.
For purposes of sections 1905(a)(2) and 1905(b)(1), it is irrele-
vant whether persons affected by the specified acts are United
States citizens, so long as they are abroad when the acts occur. This
treatment, which minimizes the importance of the nationality of the
victim of an act, is consistent with international law 8 but is not
recognized by existing SEC administrative practice. For example,
the Commission's staff traditionally has required that offshore offer-
ings be restricted to foreign nationals as a condition of the SEC's
not taking action in cases in which the issuer does not plan to
register the offering.7' Accordingly, if the Code were adopted, it
would be possible to modify the typical restriction in an agreement
among underwriters that requires members of the underwriting syn-
dicate to agree to limit their sales to noncitizens, as well as nonresi-
dents, of the United States. 0
75. RESTATEMENT, supra note 5, § 40. For a conflict of laws analysis of subject matter
jurisdiction, see Sandberg, supra note 50, at 329.
76. See text accompanying note 112 infra.
77. For the texts of §§ 1905(a)(2) and 1905(b)(1), see Appendix.
78. See note 5 supra.
79. SEC Securities Act Release No. 4708 (July 9, 1964), reprinted in 1 FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 1 1363.
80. A typical provision is the following:
We represent that we have not offered or sold, and agree that, except in transactions
with Underwriters with your prior consent and transactions through you with dealers as
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In general, these two provisions appear to embody the view,
recognized by the courts under existing securities law, that the
United States has a legitimate interest in preventing its territory
from being used as a base for exporting fraudulent securities
schemes.8 ' Although this proposition has been energetically liti-
gated, the United States' interest in asserting its jurisdiction in this
manner is manifest. Frauds perpetrated on foreigners abroad can
discourage foreign investment in the United States if the frauds are
publicly associated with United States persons or entities so as to
cast doubt upon the fairness of our markets and our ability to police
them, or upon the soundness of our financial institutions. On the
other hand, to avoid undue interference with commerce in foreign
countries, the Code's extraterritorial reach probably should be lim-
ited to those situations in which the "exported" conduct in question
rises to the level of fraud, and it should not attempt to regulate
conduct generally, for example, by requiring registration of offshore
securities distributions. Given the Code's attempt to narrow the
range of undesirable conduct that comes under the fraud rubric, 2
the approach taken by sections 1905(a)(2) and 1905(b)(1) properly
balances the relevant policy objectives.
C. Section 1905(b)(2)
Section 1905(b)(2) excludes from the registration provisions of
section 702 brokers, dealers, municipal brokers, municipal dealers,
and investment advisers, provided they are not United States resi-
dents and to the extent that they do business (a) with persons situ-
provided in Section 3, we will not, directly or indirectly, offer, sell or deliver, any Notes
acquired by us pursuant to the Purchase Agreement or this Agreement or allotted by
you to us as contemplated hereby in the United States or to any U.S. person or to others
for offering, resale or delivery, directly or indirectly, in the United States or to any U.S.
person.
As used in this paragraph "United States" means the United States of America, its
territories and possessions and all areas subject to its jurisdiction and "U.S. person"
means any national or citizen of or person resident or normally resident in the United
States, including any corporation or other entity organized under the laws of the United
States or any political subdivision thereof.
I C Industries Finance Corporation N.V., Agreement Among Underwriters, at 2, April 13,
1978. The underwriters also agree to deliver to each person to whom they sell securities a
confirmation stating that the purchaser, by accepting the secuHties, agrees to similar restric-
tions with respect to any resales made within a specified period (90 days is not uncommon)
from the date the distribution is completed.
81. ITT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1017 (2d Cir. 1975).
82. Section 916 of the Code provides that "[a] violation of part IX is not of itself a
violation of part XVI." Thus, for example, failure to obtain prompt execution of a customer's
order, as prohibited by section 913(a), would not necessarily be deemed fraudulent conduct.
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ated outside the United States, or (b) with existing clients who are
not United States citizens and are present only temporarily in the
United States.8 1 Under subclause (A) of section 1905(b)(2), as in the
case of section 1905(b)(1), it is not required that the customers or
clients be noncitizens of the United States so long as they are pres-
ent abroad.
This provision may have been intended to resolve a longstand-
ing problem faced under present law by foreign subsidiaries of
United States broker-dealers. Given the uncertainty surrounding
section 30(b) of the Securities Exchange Act,84 it is unclear which
provisions of the Act are applicable to these foreign firms, even
when they deal exclusively with foreign customers. It is normally
thought that section 30(b) should be construed to mean that the
broker-dealer registration requirements of section 15(a) of the Act,
do not apply to these foreign subsidiaries.86 While the Commission
has conceded this interpretation in an amicus brief, it has argued
that most of the other provisions of the Act are applicable, including
section 10(b) and section 15(c),87 which prohibits manipulative, de-
ceptive, or other fraudulent devices or contrivances in the over-the-
counter market."
Principles of fair competition dictate that these firms and their
foreign competitors, many of which are foreign banks acting in a
brokerage capacity, should stand in the same position with respect
to the federal securities laws. As a practical matter, however, only
foreign firms controlled by United States broker-dealers, with their
parents within easy reach of the SEC's grasp, have demonstrated
any serious concern for provisions of the United States securities
laws. An objective of the Code should be to ensure that such United
States-controlled firms can conduct their overseas activities with
confidence that they will not be at a competitive disadvantage with
respect to their foreign competitors because of unequal regulatory
83. For the text of section 1905(b)(2), see Appendix.
84. 1934 Act § 30(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78dd(b) (1976).
85. 1934 Act § 15(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(a) (1976).
86. Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 207 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied sub nom.,
Manley v. Schoenbaum, 395 U.S. 906 (1969).
87. 1934 Act § 15(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c) (1976).
88. Brief for SEC as Amicus Curiae at 24, Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200,
207 (2d Cir. 1968). In an injunctive action settled by consent, the Commission charged a
broker-dealer incorporated under Hong Kong law and operating in Thailand with violations
of §§ 15(a) (broker-dealer registration), 17(a) (booki and records), and 10(b) (antifraud) of
the Securities Exchange Act. SEC v. Siamerican Securities, Ltd., Civ. No. 75-0947 (D.D.C.
1975). Although the Commission alleged a violation of § 15(a), the defendant's customers
were primarily United States citizens residing in Southeast Asia, and most of the transactions
effected were in securities traded in United States markets.
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treatment. But this objective has not been attained in the present
draft of the Code because section 1905(b)(2) excludes nonresident
entities only from the registration provisions of section 702; the
section is silent as to the antifraud provisions of part XVI and the
market regulation provisions of part IX.
The language of section 1905(a)(2), however, might be con-
strued to apply part XVI to the foreign firm's conduct abroad. If a
foreign firm is a subsidiary of a registered United States broker-
dealer, or is under common control with such an entity, it may be
deemed to operate under the direction of a United States person,
and its activities may be deemed to be "initiated within the United
States" within the meaning of section 1905(a)(2)."1 An argument
also might be made that subclause (i) of clause (D) would apply to
these foreign subsidiaries, again assuming that direction of the sub-
sidiary's business from the United States could be demonstrated
and that such direction amounted to a "constituent element" of the
subsidiary's business activities. If clause (D) applied in this man-
ner, then, in addition to part XVI, all the market regulation provi-
sions of part IX, which by their terms apply to brokers, dealers, and
investment advisers regardless of their registered status, could be
held to apply to the foreign entity. This would include provisions
governing affiliated trading,"o marketmaking and segregation of
functions," confirmations,' 2 hypothecation and lending," short
sales," options," trading practices," and the various provisions reg-
ulating investment advisers." .
Application of either part IX or part XVI to foreign entities
controlled by United States corporations raises the question of the
jurisdiction of the United States under international law to pre-
scribe rules of law governing foreign subsidiaries of United States
corporations. According to the Restatement of Foreign Relations
Law of the United States, the United States has the power to pre-
scribe rules governing the conduct of its nationals everywhere in the
world;" however, it does not have jurisdiction to prescribe rules
89. Whether such an assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction would be consistent with
international law is discussed in the text accompanying notes 98-114 infra.
90. 1978 Draft, supra note 1, § 906(b).
91. Id. § 907.
92. Id. § 909.
93. Id. § 910.
94. Id. § 911.
95. Id. § 912.
96. Id. § 913.
97. Id. §§ 914, 915, 919.
98. RESTATEMENT, supra note 5, § 30(1)(a).
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attaching legal consequences to the conduct of aliens outside its
territory merely on the ground that such conduct affects one of its
nationals." For the United States to apply one of its statutes to a
foreign subsidiary, then, another basis of jurisdiction must be
found. The obvious nexus is control by a United States entity, but
whether control provides an adequate basis is not an easy issue to
resolve. Congress has faced this problem before in regulating the
conduct of multinational corporations. Three federal statutes illus-
trate how it has dealt with the issue of its jurisdiction over foreign
subsidiaries of United States corporations.
The Trading with the Enemy Act (TEA), 0 originally enacted
in 1917, was amended in 1933 to extend the President's power to
regulate trade between residents of foreign countries and "any per-
son . . . subject to the jurisdiction of the United States."o'0 Regula-
tions promulgated under the TEA by the Office of Foreign Assets
Control of the Treasury Department define persons "subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States" as:
(1) Any person, wheresoever located, who is a citizen or resident of the
United States;
(2) Any person actually within the United States;
(3) Any corporation organized under the laws of the United States or of
any state, territory, possession, or district of the United States; and
(4) Any partnership, association, corporation, or other organization,
wheresoever, organized or doing business, which is owned, or controlled by
persons specified in paragraphs (a) (1), (2), or (3) of this section.102
Although no prosecutions have ever been brought under the TEA,
at least one attempt by the Treasury Department to regulate the
sales of a foreign subsidiary of a United States corporation provoked
serious opposition from a foreign country. 03 The TEA, as applied to
United States-controlled subsidiaries trading with Cuba, also has
been a subject of continuing controversy with foreign governments,
particularly Canada.o'0 Nonetheless, Congress has taken no steps to
amend the TEA.
The administrative experience of the Treasury Department
under the TEA, however, may have been reflected in the approach
Congress took to the problem of controlled foreign entities in the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (FCPA)."' Among other
99. Id. § 30(2).
100. 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-44 (1970).
101. Id. § 5(b)(1)(B).
102. 31 C.F.R. § 500.329 (1977) (emphasis added).
103. Judgment of Cours d'appel, Paris, [1965] J.C.P. II, Nos. 14, 174 (litigation involv-
ing Freuhauf Corporation).
104. See text accompanying note 112 infra.
105. 15 U.S.C. § 78q, 78dd-1, 78dd-2, 78ff (Supp. I 1978).
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things, the FCPA makes it unlawful for a "domestic concern" to
make payments to any foreign official or politician if the payment
is made "corruptly." An earlier version of the FCPA would have
included within the definition of "domestic concern" any legal en-
tity "owned or controlled by individuals who are citizens or nation-
als of the United States."'o The final version, however, limited the
definition of "domestic concern" to United States citizens or resi-
dents, including corporations organized or having their principal
place of business in the United States; domestically owned or con-
trolled foreign entities were excluded.'17 The conference report
stated that "the conferees recognized the inherent jurisdictional,
enforcement, and diplomatic difficulties raised by the inclusion of
foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies in the direct prohibitions of
the bill."'
The question of extending a statute extraterritorially to reach
subsidiaries of United States corporations also arose in connection
with the Export Administration Amendments of 1977 (EAA).' The
EAA amended the Export Administration Act of 1969 to put teeth
into the United States' policy of discouraging compliance with for-
eign boycotts of countries friendly to the United States. It applies
to "any United States person, with respect to his activities in the
interstate or foreign commerce of the United States.""" A "United
States person" is defined to include "any United States resident or
national . .. ,any domestic concern . . . and any foreign subsidi-
ary or affiliate . . . of any domestic concern which is controlled in
fact by such domestic concern, as determined under regulations of
the President.""' A Senate report on an earlier version of the EAA
contains language indicating a congressional belief that application
of a statute to foreign entities is justified so long as there is a connec-
tion with United States commerce:
By limiting the reach of the law to activities of U.S. persons in the inter-
state or foreign commerce of the United States, S.69 would avoid unwarranted
intrusions into the affairs of foreign countries not participating in a foreign
boycott. A subsidiary of a U.S. company in Canada, for example, is, from the
Canadian and every legal point of view, a Canadian citizen. U.S. restrictions
on that company's ability to trade or do business with the Middle East would
106. H.R. 3815, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
107. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(d)(1) (Supp. I 1978).
108. H.R. REP. No. 831, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1977).
109. 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 2403-1a (West Supp. 1978).
110. Id. § 2403-la(a)(1). The Department of Commerce has promulgated regulations
specifying when the activities of a person are in United States commerce. 15 C.F.R. § 369.1(d)
(1978).
111. 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 2410(2) (West Supp. 1978).
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be deeply resented, as were recently ended U.S. efforts to prohibit Canadian
subsidiaries of U.S. firms from trading with Cuba.
Such restrictions can be justified where U.S. commerce is involved, for
example where a U.S. company's Canadian subsidiary purchases goods or
services from the United States in connection with its Middle East trade.
There a direct U.S. interest is involved. But otherwise the interest is tangential
and attempts to pursue it in such circumstances unnecessarily intrude upon
the sovereignty of others.
Equally relevant are the serious obstacles to enforcement of U.S. law
against foreign companies not engaged in U.S. commerce. The fact that they
may happen to be subsidiaries of U.S. concerns does not resolve the problem.
It is difficult, if not impossible, in most instances to secure the requisite juris-
diction over a foreign company with no connection with U.S. commerce. Where
the U.S. parent commands the illegal action, the parent itself would be liable,
and no unusual jurisdictional problems are presented. But where the subsidi-
ary acts on its own and the transaction has no connection with U.S. commerce,
the jurisdictional hurdles may be insuperable. Hence, S.69 goes as far as it is
realistically possible to go by limiting its reach to transactions which involve
U.S. commerce."2
Thus, in enacting the EAA, Congress considered the jurisdictional
problem but felt that the extension of the statutory prohibitions to
controlled foreign companies was supportable because of the Act's
limitation to activities in United States commerce.
Since no judicial decision has tested any of the above statutory
provisions, it is impossible to predict how the courts would apply
international law to them."' One can observe, however, that in the
case of the FCPA and the EAA, in the enactment of which Congress
considered and discussed the extraterritorial effect of its legislation,
the furthest it was willing to go was in the EAA, in which it pre-
scribed rules governing the conduct of United States-controlled or
affiliated entities only when those entities were engaged in United
States commerce. Congress apparently intended to require at least
some meaningful connection with United States business activities
as a condition of asserting jurisdiction, even in a case in which the
thrust of its legislative initiative was specifically concerned with
transnational activity.
Of course, the question of jurisdiction over a foreign entity is
distinct from the question whether Congress desires to regulate that
entity. As indicated by the Senate report quoted above, Congress
may choose to avoid the jurisdictional question by regulating the
United States parent in those cases in which the parent is found to
have directed a foreign entity to violate the law in question.", To
112. S. REP. No. 104, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 26-27 (1977).
113. An action has been filed challenging the constitutionality of the Export Adminis-
tration Amendments of 1977, but plaintiff is a domestic manufacturer and exporter of goods
to certain Arab countries. Trane Co. v. Kreps, No. 78-6413 (W.D. Wis., filed Sept. 1978).
114. See text accompanying note 112 supra.
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avoid future disputes over whether Congress sought to pursue this
course in the Code, section 1905(b) (2) should be drafted to leave no
doubt as to whether controlled foreign firms must comply with parts
IX and XVI. If they must, their parents may be in violation of the
Code for directing the foreign firms to carry out activities that these
provisions forbid.
If neither section 1905(a)(2) nor clause (D) is construed to ex-
tend the antifraud and market regulation provisions of the Code to
foreign subsidiaries of United States broker-dealers, the area would
be left open to SEC rulemaking pursuant to section 1905(c)(1)(C),
as discussed below."-' The Commission, however, is admonished by
the preamble to its grant of authority in section 1905(c) to use its
rulemaking authority "in the light of the significance or effects
within the United States of particular acts or conduct.""' This re-
striction probably would preclude the promulgation of rules extend-
ing either the antifraud or market regulation provisions to the over-
seas activities of foreign broker-dealers, despite their United States
parentage. In any event, there is no reason for the Code to leave
unresolved the question of its applicability to overseas subsidiaries
of United States brokers; it should clarify the matter absolutely,
preferably by excluding the persons described in section 1905(b) (2)
from all the provisions of the Code.
D. Section 1905(b) (3)
Section 1905(b) (3)117 speaks to participation by nonresident
brokers and dealers in offshore distributions and limited offerings."'
It provides that participants in these offerings need not be registered
under section 702 so long as their activity is limited to purchasing
securities for sale abroad and to participating in underwriting group
activities performed by a registered broker or dealer. This approach
is consistent with the SEC's existing administrative position,", ex-
cept that, as elsewhere in section 1905(b), there is no requirement
that the purchasers in the distribution or offering be noncitizens of
the United States. 2 0 Again, the Commission has rulemaking author-
ity under section 1905(c)(1)(B) to alter or condition this exclusion.
115. The Commission's rulemaking authority is discussed in the text accompanying
note 123 infra.
116. For the full text of § 1905(c), see Appendix.
117. For the full text of § 1905(b)(3), see Appendix.
118. A limited offering is the Code's term for a private placement. 1978 Draft, supra
note 1, § 242(b).
119. SEC Securities Act Release No. 4708 (July 9, 1964), reprinted in 1 FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) TT 1361-63.
120. See text accompanying note 79 supra.
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Typically, the problem faced by counsel to underwriters of off-
shore offerings is not broker-dealer registration but the question of
when an offshore distribution has "come to rest" so that resales in
the United States of the distributed securities can occur without the
need to prepare and file an "offering statement."I21 The Code seem-
ingly resolves this problem by its silence. Under section 1905(b) (1)
an offer or sale of securities that occurs abroad is excluded from the
Code, provided there is no fraudulent activity, and it appears that
this exclusion is not affected by subsequent resales in the United
States of the securities sold abroad. Therefore, the reseller need only
bring his transaction outside the definition of a "distribution," for
which section 502 requires an offering statement; for example, he
may be able to avail himself of the exclusion provided for "trading
transactions"12 under section 242(c) of the Code.
E. Section 1905(c)
Section 1905(c)(1) gives the Commission rulemaking authority,
within the limits of international law and clause (D), in three areas:
(1) it can contract the coverage of the Code with respect to the
subject matter of section 1905(a); (2) it can expand the coverage of
the Code with respect to the subject matter of section 1905(b); and
(3) it can expand or contract the coverage of the Code with respect
to any other subject matter.'" Additionally, as noted above,124 the
Commission is required to use its rulemaking authority "in the light
of the significance or effects within the United States of particular
acts or conduct." This clause instructs the Commission not to press
its rulemaking authority to the limits of international law to govern
conduct that has no substantial impact in the United States.
Section 1905(c) raises several problems. The first is the proper
construction of the reference in the preamble to clause (D). Since
the SEC's authority already is circumscribed by the limits of inter-
national law, the reference would have meaning only if clause (D)
imposed an additional limitation. As noted above,'" it appears that
the terms of clause (D) are at least as broad as international law;
thus, it is unclear what additional limitation the drafters intended.
Perhaps this unnecessary reference could be eliminated.
121. An offering statement is the Code counterpart of a registration statement under
the Securities Act of 1933. See 1978 Draft, supra note 1, § 502.
122. A trading transaction is the Code's term for a broker's transaction under § 4(4) of
the 1933 Act. See 1978 Draft, supra note 1, § 242(c).
123. For the full text of § 1905(c), see Appendix.
124. See text accompanying note 116 supra.
125. See text accompanying notes 67-75 supra.
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Another question concerns clause (2) of section 1905(c). Under
that clause, the Commission is obliged to prescribe the extent to
which the registration provisions of section 402 apply with respect
to nonresident issuers. The Code obviously intends the Commission
to draft exemptive rules for foreign issuers comparable to those
presently in effect under section 12(g) of the Act. 2 6 Interestingly,
this provision does not mention sections 14 and 16 of the Act,m2
although by SEC rule foreign issuers are exempt from these sec-
tions,I28 which regulate proxy solicitations and insider trading. It has
long been recognized that to subject foreign issuers to these sections
would be tantamount to imposing upon them our own notions of
corporate governance, 29 a step that even the SEC thus far has been
reluctant to take. Because of the dismay with which other nations
doubtless would view an attempt by the United States to affect the
conduct of corporations domiciled within their borders, Congress
ought to give serious consideration to writing these exemptions into
the Code rather than leaving their scope to the Commission's discre-
tion.
An additional problem raised by section 1905(c) concerns its
scope. It has been criticized by at least one author as relegating to
the Commission an excessive amount of rulemaking authority. 3 o
Implicit in this criticism is the fear that the Commission might
ignore all United States policy obligations other than investor pro-
tection and either wield its rulemaking authority to expand its juris-
diction to the maximum extent permitted by international law, or
fail to reduce its jurisdiction in appropriate circumstances. It also
has been asserted that this fear assumes that in exercising its rule-
making authority the Commission cannot be relied on to give due
regard to broader considerations, such as foreign and monetary pol-
icy.'3' These broader considerations might include the effect of the
United States' assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction upon its rela-
tions with other nations, its international payments, the ability of
United States-owned financial institutions to compete abroad, and
the risk of retaliatory action by foreign governments against United
States financial institutions. Before accepting the validity of this
criticism, however, a closer look at the Commission's authority
126. 1934 Act § 12g, 15 U.S.C. § 781(g) (1976).
127. 1934 Act §§ 14, 16, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78n, 78p (1976).
128. 17 C.F.R. § 240.3al2-3 (1978).
129. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7746 (Nov. 16, 1965), reprinted in
[1964-1966 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 1 77,301. See also Karmel, supra note
12, at 674 n.18.
130. Karmel, supra note 12, at 701-04.
131. Id. at 703.
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under section 1905(c) is warranted.
The only area in which section 1905(c)(1) permits the SEC to
expand the Code's coverage is with respect to the subject matter of
section 1905(b) and any other subject matter not covered by section
1905(a). It is true that the Commission, by indiscriminate exercise
of its rulemaking power, could narrow the carefully crafted exclu-
sions of section 1905(b), subject to the limitations described above.
There is good reason to doubt, however, that this result would
ensue. As noted above, most of the exclusions afforded by that sec-
tion are consistent with existing administrative practice as it has
been developed by, or with the active participation of, the Commis-
sion and its staff. Although the Code effects a minor relaxation of
existing practice, in so far as it excludes sales abroad to United
States citizens, in large measure it merely excludes activity that the
Commission has shown little inclination to regulate, at least in the
absence of fraud. To the extent fraud exists, section 1905 (a) (2) may
make part XVI applicable in any event. Moreover, any proposed
contraction of the exclusions of section 1905(b) would have to go
through the normal rulemaking process, providing ample opportun-
ity for contrary points of view to be heard.
The Commission also has authority under section 1905(c) to
expand (as well as contract) the Code's coverage in any area not
dealt with by section 1905(a) or (b). The precise scope of this au-
thority is difficult to discern because of the uncertainty regarding
the scope of clause (D).1" With or without clause (D), however,
section 1905(a) is an expansive provision. Clause (A) of that section
covers many of the basic types of conduct regulated by the Code,133
and, as previously noted, a single act within the United States may
trigger clause (A)'s applicability."' Thus, the ground left untouched
by section 1905(a) may well prove to be relatively narrow, leaving
the Commission few new fields to plow.
The other concern expressed about the Commission's rulemak-
ing authority is that, judging by the Commission's failure to adopt
rules under section 30(b),'3 5 it is hopeless to rely on the Commission
to contract the scope of the Code delineated in section 1905(a). This
criticism is based on the assumption that the scope of that provision
is too broad. Indeed, according to the Reporter, the goal of section
1905 was to make the coverage of the Code quite broad and to rely
132. See text accompanying notes 67-75 supra.
133. See text accompanying note 58 supra.
134. See text accompanying note 60 supra.
135. See Karmel, supra note 12, at 701; TD-3, supra note 18, § 1604, Reporter's Com-
ments, at 164.
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on Commission rulemaking to tailor that broad grant of legislative
power "to the appropriate policy considerations in the myriad con-
texts that could result in litigation."' While it is difficult to disa-
gree with those who suggest that the Commission is unlikely to use
often or aggressively its rulemaking power to reduce the scope of
section 1905(a), this should be a cause for concern only if certain
other problems with the Code are not resolved by Congress. The
most desirable way to solve these problems is for Congress to narrow
the scope of clause (A) by including a greater contacts requirement
and to eliminate clause (D), as suggested above.' If this is done,
there will be no need to depend unduly upon the Commission to
reduce the scope of section 1905(a).
IV. CONCLUSION
Although section 1905 might profit from some fine tuning, it is
a vast improvement over the present confusing state of the law. If
the Code is adopted, this section will make much simpler the life of
those who must advise foreign entities, or domestic entities engaging
in transnational business dealings, as to the laws that govern their
conduct. Nevertheless, several drafting and substantive problems
remain. These relate primarily to clauses (A) and (D) of section
1905(a) and paragraph (2) of section 1905(b).13 1 It is hoped that these
problems will receive adequate attention when Congress considers
the Code and that Congress, rather than relying upon the Commis-
sion and the courts to shape the ultimate contours of section 1905,
instead will engage in its own weighing of the various policy objec-
tives that are relevant to the United States' regulation of transna-
tional securities transactions.
136. See TD-3, supra note 18, § 1604, Reporter's Comments, at 165.
137. The suggested changes in these portions of the Code are discussed in the text
accompanying notes 62 (§ 1905(a)(1)(A)) & 76 (§ 1905(a)(1)(D)) supra.
138. The suggested change in § 1905(b)(2) is discussed in the text accompanying note
116 supra.
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APPENDIX
Sec. 1905. [Relation to other countries.] (a) [Application
extraterritorially.] (1) Within the limits of international law, this
Code (as defined in section 225) applies with respect to
(A) (i) a sale or purchase of a security, an offer to sell or
buy a security, or an inducement not to buy or sell a security,
(ii) a proxy solicitation or other circularization of security hold-
ers, (iii) a tender offer or a recommendation to security holders
in favor of or opposition to a tender offer, or (iv) any activity as
an investment adviser that occurs (in each case) within the
United States although it is initiated outside the United States;
(B) a nonresident of the United States that has a status
described in section 1902(b), to the extent that the Code at-
taches consequences to such a status;
(C) an attempt, solicitation, or conspiracy outside the
United States to commit a violation of this Code within the
United States (except that section 1905(a) (1) (C) applies only for
purposes of section 1821); and
(D) any other prohibited, required, or actionable conduct
(i) whose constituent elements occur to a substantial (but not
necessarily predominant) extent within the United States or (ii)
some or all of whose constituent elements occur outside the
United States but cause a substantial effect within it (of a type
that this Code is designed to prevent) as a direct and reasonably
foreseeable result of the conduct.
(2) Within the limits of international law, part XVI, together
with those sections in part XVII that create liability for conduct in
violation of part XVI, applies with respect to an act specified in
section 1905(a)(1)(A) that is initiated within the United States al-
though it occurs outside the United States.
(b) [Nonapplication extraterritorially.] (1) Except as pro-
vided in section 1905(a)(2), this Code (as defined in section 225)
does not apply with respect to an act specified in section
1905(a)(1)(A) that occurs outside the United States although it is
initiated within the United States.
(2) Section 702 does not apply with respect to a broker, dealer,
municipal broker, municipal dealer, or investment adviser, not a
resident of the United States, insofar as he does business with (A)
a person outside the United States or (B) a non-national of the
United States who is present as a nonresident within the United
States and was previously a customer or client.
(3) Section 702 does not apply with respect to a broker or
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dealer, not a resident of the United States, insofar as he participates
in a distribution or a limited offering if his only connection with the
United States as a broker or dealer, so far as the distribution or
limited offering is concerned, consists of (A) taking down securities
for sale outside the United States and (B) participating solely
through his group membership in group activities of a principal
underwriter who is a registered broker or dealer.
(c) [Rulemaking authority.] Within the limits of interna-
tional law and section 1905(a) (1) (D), and in the light of the signifi-
cance or effects within the United States of particular acts or con-
duct, the Commission, by rule,
(1) may provide (A) that this Code does not apply with
respect to the subject matter of section 1905(a), (B) that it does
apply with respect to the subject matter of section 1905(b), and
(C) that it does or does not apply with respect to any other
subject matters; and
(2) shall prescribe the extent to which section 402 applies
with respect to an issuer that is not a resident of the United
States.
(d) [Foreign corrupt practices by registrants.] (1) It is unlaw-
ful for a registrant, or an officer, director, employee, agent, or stock-
holder acting on its behalf, corruptly to pay or give or offer or prom-
ise to pay or give (or to authorize the payment or gift or the promise
of a payment or gift of) any money or anything of value to a foreign
official, foreign political party, or candidate for foreign political
office (or to any other person if the first person knows or reasonably
should know that some or all of the money or thing of value will be
paid, given, offered, or promised, directly or indirectly, to any such
official, party, or candidate) for purposes of
(A) influencing any of his or its acts or decisions in an
official capacity, including a decision to fail to perform an
official function, or
(B) inducing the use of his or its influence with a foreign
government or a department, agency, or instrumentality thereof
to affect or influence any of its decisions, in order to assist the
registrant in obtaining or retaining business for or with, or di-
recting business to, any person.
(2) For purposes of section 1905(d)(1), "foreign official"
means an officer or employee of, or a person acting in an official
capacity for or on behalf of, a foreign government, a department,
agency, or instrumentality thereof, or a foreign political party;
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but the term does not include such an employee whose duties
are essentially clerical or ministerial.
(e) [Jurisdiction.] (1) A nonresident of the United States
in any of the following categories (other than a foreign govern-
ment with sovereign immunity) shall file with the Commission
an irrevocable consent and submission to jurisdiction in any
action or proceeding against him (or his personal representative
if he is a natural person) created by or based on a violation of
this Code (as defined in section 225) and brought, whether in a
Federal or State court or before the Commission, after the filing
of the consent; such a consent has the same force and validity
as an express consent and submission to jurisdiction in connec-
tion with a particular action or proceeding; it shall be filed in
whatever form the Commission prescribes by rule; and the same
instrument shall appoint whatever official (or his successor in
office) the Commission so designates to be an attorney to receive
notice of process, pleadings, or other papers:
(A) A prospective registrant, or any other person that is an
applicant for registration under this Code, shall file such a con-
sent before the registration statement or application for registra-
tion becomes effective.
(B) A person who is to be one of the officers of a prospec-
tive registrant specified in section 1704(b)(2), or a director or
officer of a person (other than a prospective registrant) who is
an applicant for registration under this Code, shall file such a
consent before the registration statement or application for reg-
istration becomes effective.
(C) A person who becomes such an officer of a registrant,
a director or officer of a person (other than a registrant) who is
registered under this Code, or a participant in a registered clear-
ing agency shall file such a consent, retroactive to the date of his
becoming such an officer, director, or participant, within what-
ever period the Comission specifies by rule.
(D) In the case of an offering or distribution statement a
secondary distributor or underwriter who is not a resident of the
United States, and in the case of an offering statement an expert
whose consent is filed under section 2003(e) and who is not a
resident of the United States (whether or not in either case the
issuer is a resident), shall file such a consent before the offering
statement becomes effective or when the distribution statement
is filed.
(2) A rule under section 303 or 514 may require the filing of
1979]1 525
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW.
consents similar to those required by section 1905 (e) (1).
(3) When any person, whether or not he is a resident of the
United States or has filed a consent under section 1905(e)(1), en-
gages in conduct to which this Code applies as a result of section
1905(a) or (c), the Federal and State courts and the Commission
have jurisdiction with respect to an action or proceeding against him
(or his representative if he is a natural person) that (A) is created
by or based on a violation of this Code (as defined in section 225)
and (B) arises from that conduct or a resultant effect within the
meaning of section 1905(a)(1)(D). See also section 1822(h).
(4) Jurisdiction may not be exercised under section 1905(e)(1)
to (3) inclusive unless the plaintiff (which includes the Commission
in an administrative proceeding instituted by it)
(A) leaves a copy of the process in the office of any desig-
nated attorney,
(B) sends a copy, by any form of mail or other communi-
cation that requires a return receipt, to the defendant or respon-
dent at his last address on file (or a later address if supplied by
a designated attorney), or, in the absence of such an address,
sends him a copy by such mail or other communication at his
last known address (if any) or takes other steps reasonably cal-
culated to give notice (except that the plaintiff in any event need
take only whatever steps are reasonably calculated to give notice
if the country to which a copy would be mailed does not permit
notice by mail or other communication), and
(C) files in the action or proceeding an affidavit of compli-
ance with section 1905(e)(4) on or before the return date of the
process, if any, or within whatever further time the court (or the
Commission in an administrative proceeding) allows.
(5) Section 1905(e) does not limit or affect any other basis of
jurisdiction authorized by law.
(f) [Actions in foreign courts.] (1) Nothing in section 1711
applies to an action in a foreign court, or is intended to affect the
decision of a foreign court whether-to entertain an action to which
that section applies.
(2) Nothing in section 1822(a) affects the jurisdiction of a for-
eign court.
(g) [Cross-references.] See also sections 918(d), 1202(b)(2),
1402(c), 1505(g)(3), 1511(b)(1), 2004(b)(3)(E), and 2004(e).
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